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Abstract
Using variations in UI policies over time and across U.S. states, this paper provides evidence
that allowing unemployed workers to delay the collection of benefits increases their job-finding
rate. In a model with discrete job take-up decisions, benefit entitlement, wage-indexed benefits,
and heterogeneous job types, I demonstrate that the policy can increase an unemployed worker’s
willingness to work, even though more benefits in general reduce the relative value of employment.
In a calibrated quantitative model, I find that allowing delayed benefit collection increases the
overall job finding rates and may lower unemployment rate both in a steady state stationary
economy and over a transition path during 2008-2012.
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1 Introduction
A common assumption in the literature on unemployment insurance (UI) policy is that once an
unemployed worker finds a job, she loses any uncollected benefits. This assumption does not, how-
ever, always hold. During recessions, the “retention policy” in the U.S. allows workers to delay the
collection of existing UI benefits to future unemployment spells. This policy encourages unemployed
workers to take up short-term low-paying jobs without worrying about low or zero benefits and
reduced consumption in future unemployment spells. To the extent that the policy helps smooth
consumption between two unemployment spells, it potentially reduces the cost of unemployment for
risk averse individuals.
In this paper, I first empirically document that during recessions workers in the U.S. can and
do delay the collection of UI benefits to future unemployment spells. There are differences both
across states and over time in how easily an unemployed worker can delay collection of leftover
benefits. Exploiting these differences, I find evidence that during the most recent recession, easier
delayed benefit collection induced unemployed workers to take up jobs sooner. Intuitively, because
UI benefits are proportional to wage income, low-paying jobs qualify for lower benefits. Thus, an
unemployed worker has less incentive to take a low-paying or short-term job because of low future
benefits when she becomes unemployed again. With the retention policy, if the worker has leftover
benefits when she starts a job, she can delay the collection to future unemployment spells.
Motivated by this evidence, I extend the canonical McCall (1970) framework to incorporate
features of the retention policy. In particular, suppose jobs arrive exogenously, and each period
unemployed workers decide whether to accept a job and start working the next period. Employed
workers may qualify for UI benefits through working. If a newly unemployed worker qualifies for
benefits, she receives a fixed amount of benefits each period for a finite number of periods. The level
of benefits received each period is proportional to the worker’s wages prior to unemployment.
Absent the retention policy once an unemployed worker finds a job, any uncollected benefits
are forfeited. With the retention policy, the uncollected benefits stay on the worker’s record, and
when she becomes unemployed again she can choose between any newly qualified UI benefits and
the leftover benefits.1 By giving the worker a choice in future benefits, the retention policy increases
the expected value of employment by (weakly) increasing the value of future unemployment. With
the retention policy, the unemployed workers take up jobs sooner, and the aggregate job-finding rate
is higher.2
1As an example, suppose a worker qualifies for 26 weeks of benefits of $200 per month. He finds a job after collecting
benefits for 6 weeks. Without the retention policy, he loses the 20 weeks of benefits, and whether he qualifies for benefits
when he becomes unemployed again depends on how much he works between the two unemployment spells. With the
retention policy, if he does not qualify for new benefits when he becomes unemployed again, he can continue collecting
the 20 weeks of benefits. If he qualifies for new benefits, then he can choose between the leftover 20 weeks of old
benefits and the newly qualified benefits.
2A key assumption here is that workers do not quit into unemployment. This assumption is supported by the fact
that in the U.S. workers who quit typically are not eligible to collect UI benefits, although quits are sometimes hard
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The impact of the retention policy on the unemployed worker’s job take-up decision depends
on three factors. First, the effect is larger when the offered job has a shorter expected job tenure
(such as a temp job). When the worker expects a job to end sooner, her income during the subse-
quent unemployment is more important. Since the retention policy affects the value of her future
unemployment, its impact on her current job decision is stronger when the offered job has a shorter
expected tenure. Second, the effect of the retention policy is larger when the difference in wages
between previous and future jobs is (positive) larger. A positive wage difference means that the
current UI benefits are higher than the expected future benefits. The larger the wage difference, the
larger the difference between current and future benefits, and the more retention policy raises the
value of employment for unemployed workers. The retention policy is hence more likely to affect
the decision to take a low wage job. Third, the effect is larger when the benefit duration is longer
such as with UI extensions during a recession. A longer UI entitlement gives the unemployed worker
more leftover benefits to carry over to a future unemployment spell, thus increasing the effect of the
retention policy.
To evaluate the effect of the retention policy on the aggregate job finding rate and unemployment
rate, both at the steady state and over the transition, I calibrate the model steady states using data
on the wage distribution and the distribution of wage changes between pre- and post-unemployment
work derived from the Survey of Income Program Participation (SIPP) panels. In a (stationary)
steady state resembling 2012, consistent with the intuitions, the retention policy induces unemployed
workers to accept low-paying or short-tenured jobs sooner, and as a result the overall job finding rate
is higher. The effect on the unemployment rate is ambiguous, depending on the relative size of the
increase in job finding rate and the shift of workers into short-duration jobs. The aggregate impacts
are similar over a transition during 2008-2012.
This paper contributes to the understanding of how UI policy affects unemployed workers’ job
search behavior. Previous literature has studied how benefit level and benefit duration affect search.
Empirical evidence in the literature suggests that more generous UI benefits are associated with longer
spells of unemployment; see Krueger and Meyer (2002) for a survey of the earlier literature.3 I find
that because of the retention policy in recessions, higher benefit levels or longer benefit durations
do not necessarily mean lower job finding probabilities. In fact, higher expected benefits in future
unemployment spells may increase the job finding probability of current unemployed workers.4
to distinguish from other reasons of unemployment; see, for example, Zhang and Faig (2012). In Section 5 I relax
this assumption and allow workers to quit into unemployment and still eligible to collect unemployment benefits. The
results are similar to the baseline results without the option to quit.
3More recently, Krueger and Mueller (2010) use time use data to find that for a subgroup of benefit-eligible unem-
ployed workers, more generous benefits reduce their job search time. At the same time, they find that search activity
of the benefit-eligible unemployed spikes as benefit exhaustion (26 weeks) approaches, which suggests that longer UI
duration is associated with less search by the unemployed workers.
4Because the effect of the retention policy requires that workers form expectation about future benefits, government
commitment to these expected future benefits is implicitly assumed. Pei and Xie (2016) examines the effects of
government commitment to future policies on the optimal UI benefits over business cycles.
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Another strand of the literature looks at specific policy details and studies how they affect search
behavior. For example, Zhang and Faig (2012) examine how endogenous UI eligibility affects search,
and find that when UI benefits must be earned with employment, generous UI becomes an additional
benefit to working. The current paper complements their work by incorporating a form of endogenous
eligibility and wage-indexed benefits, so that working at a high-paying job has the additional benefit
of potentially qualifying for higher benefits in unemployment. With the retention policy, this benefit
extends into future unemployment spells.
Because the effect of the retention policy is more quantitatively relevant during recessions when
the maximum potential UI duration is extended, the study of the retention policy has implications
for the optimal cyclical UI policy; see, for example, Jung and Kuester (2015), and Mitman and
Rabinovich (2015). As the retention policy changes with the scale of UI extensions, incorporating
the retention policy in models evaluating the UI extensions will affect the quantitative results. In
fact, quantitatively I find that the retention policy mitigates the adverse effect of UI extensions.5
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the policy background and presents
empirical evidence pertaining to policy variations. Section 3 uses a simple model to illustrate the
effect of the retention policy. Section 4 presents a quantitative model and analysis based on calibrated
parameters. Section 5 discusses extensions to the baseline quantitative model. Results of these
extensions are included in Appendix D. Section 6 concludes.
2 Policy Background and Empirical Evidence
2.1 Background on retention policy
The U.S. retention policy allows unemployed workers to delay collection of UI benefits to future
unemployment spells.6 Two important ingredients here are that workers qualify for benefits through
work—so not all unemployed workers receive benefits—and the monthly benefit payout amount
(“benefit level”) is proportional to wages received during the most recent employment. The retention
policy changes over time. In addition, while the majority of states have the retention policy, states
differ in how easy it is for unemployed workers to take advantage of the retention policy.
Policy variations over time During normal times, when the maximum potential UI duration is 26
weeks, an unemployed worker has up to one year (“benefit collection window”) to use all 26 weeks.
As an example, an unemployed worker who qualifies for 26 weeks of benefits and starts collecting on
January 1, 2005 may collect during anytime before January 1, 2006. During this time, if she finds a
5See, for example, Fujita (2010), Rothstein (2011), Nakajima (2012), Hagedorn et al. (2015), and Chodorow-Reich
et al. (2018) for evaluations of the impact of UI extensions in recessions.
6This section focuses on explaining the variations over time and across states in the retention policy and abstracts
from the variations in UI extensions. While UI extensions also vary over time in recessions, it does not affect the
cross-sectional empirical analysis. The variations across states are controlled for in the empirical analysis by taking
data from a time when states in the sample implemented roughly the same length of UI extensions.
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job after collecting benefits for 13 weeks, then she may collect the other 13 weeks if she loses her job
again before January 1, 2006. A complication arises if the employment during this one-year period
qualifies her for a new UI segment. When this happens, the worker may choose whether to continue
collecting the 13 weeks left over from before, or start the new UI segment. However, she may not
keep both UI segments.
The retention policy plays a more important role in recessions for three reasons. First, the benefit
collection window is extended with UI benefit extensions such as during the Great Recession when
the UI benefits were extended from 26 to over 90 weeks. With these extensions, the benefit collection
window is also extended from one year to as long as the extensions are in effect. For example, during
the Great Recession, extensions were in effect for four years (from 2008 to the end of 2013). Second,
long-term jobs are harder to find in a recession. With short-term employment, it is more likely that
at the end of a job the worker is still within the collection window of the benefit that she started
before taking the job.
Third, the opportunity to choose between leftover benefits and new UI segment makes a difference
if the benefit level is high enough on the leftover benefits that the workers will choose the leftover
benefits. Jobs before the start of the recession likely qualify for higher benefits than jobs during a
recession. This is true if during the recession a worker is forced to take a job that pays much less
than her job before the recession.7
I therefore focus on the effects of the retention policy during recessions.8 It is worth noting
that unlike during normal times when the worker can choose between leftover benefits and newly
qualified benefits, in recessions, the retention policy is more restrictive on choice. In particular,
once the worker qualifies for new benefits, she may not continue collecting any leftover benefits from
before. This restriction was in place until July 2010, when a federal legislation awarded the choice
of UI segments to the unemployed worker.9
Policy variations across U.S. states In addition to variations over time, the retention policy also
differs across states. In particular, states differ in how much work is needed to re-qualify for a new
UI segment when the worker already has an open UI segment. Most states require a worker to
7As an example, suppose a worker is laid off from a regular, long-term job at General Electric and cannot find a
similar job during the recession. She is then forced to work at a temporary job at McDonald’s. The two jobs potentially
differ in two dimensions—wages and job security. Wages are likely higher at General Electric, and job security is likely
worse at McDonald’s especially if the job is temporary. Because of lower wages, if the worker qualifies for new UI
benefits at McDonald’s, the new benefit level is lower than her benefits after working at General Electric. At the same
time, because of shorter job tenure, the job at McDonald’s may not qualify for new UI benefits, in which case being
able to continue collecting any leftover benefits will be even more valuable.
8For tractability, in the model I assume that the retention policy has negligible effect during normal times, and only
plays a role in recessions.
9The reason for the restriction is that extended benefits in recessions come from federal funding, whereas the first
26 weeks of benefits are funded through states. Under the UI regulation prior to July 2010, benefits funded by states
must be collected first before federal benefits, and in cases where more than one benefit segments are open, state-
funded benefits take precedence. The regulation P.L. 111-205 “Unemployment Compensation Extension Act of 2010”,
approved on July 22, 2010 (HR 4213), relaxed the funding restrictions and effectively gave the unemployed workers the
choice between new and old uncollected benefits (Department of Labor 2015).
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earn over a one-year period a multiple (from 3 to 10) of the benefit amount to re-qualify for a new
UI segment. The restriction on retention policy before July 2010 means that when an unemployed
worker re-qualifies for a new UI segment, she has to start collecting the new segment. Given this
restriction, it is easier for an unemployed worker to collect leftover benefits in states with a higher
multiple and hence harder to re-qualify. Appendix A contains an example to illustrate the cross-state
policy difference. In the empirical section, I exploit the cross-state pattern to demonstrate the effects
of retention policy.
Evidence of policy effects on individual choice Are the unemployed workers sufficiently knowledgeable
and rational to take into account such complicated policy structures and anticipate changes during
future unemployment spells. On the unemployment forum of the web site City-Data,10 a popular
forum site for U.S. city information with around 1.5 million members, many unemployed workers
discussed how taking a temp or part-time job would impact their UI benefit receipts. Figure 1
presents two examples of questions asked on the forum that are related to the retention policy.
These two posts illustrate that the unemployed workers do indeed consider the effect of taking a job,
especially a temp or part-time job, on their future unemployment benefits.
Figure 1: Example discussions on the retention policy and short-term job on City-Data.
10http://www.city-data.com/forum/unemployment.
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2.2 Empirical evidence on the effect of retention policy
To empirically document the effect of the retention policy on re-employment, I exploit policy varia-
tions across states before July 2010 and the lack of variations after July 2010.
I first group states according to how hard it is to re-qualify for a new UI segment. Group I
consists of states where it is easy to re-qualify. These states require a worker to earn 3 to 4 times of
her current benefit amount within a one-year period in order to re-qualify. Group II consists of states
with income multiples of 5 or 6. Group III includes states with income multiples of 8 or 10. In this
last group of states it is hardest to re-qualify for new benefits and hence easiest to collect leftover
benefits from previous segments.11 Figure 2 maps the grouping of states. Geographically, Group I
(purple colored) are dispersed throughout the country; Group II (yellow colored) are concentrated
in the west, southwest and northeast; Group III (green colored) are mostly in the east and central
parts of the country.
Figure 2: State’s policy multiple for re-qualifying second UI segment
Group I (low multiple) States Group II (medium multiple) States Group III (high multiple) States
Data come from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to conduct both state-
level and individual-level analyses. The SIPP is a longitudinal survey that interviews respondents
every four months and records monthly labor market activities and program (e.g. unemployment
11No states have a multiple 7 or 9. Virginia does not have an income requirement to re-qualify for a new segment.
In all other states, the re-qualifying threshold (the multiple) remains unchanged during the sample period.
7
benefit receipt) participation status. The 2008 panel includes information from May 2008 to Decem-
ber 2013, exactly covering the period of UI extensions and the July 2010 federal law.
I restrict the sample to individuals ages 20 to 64 as this is the group most likely to be active
participants in the labor market. A person is unemployed if she is without a job and is reportedly
actively searching for a new job. Following the literature (e.g. Cullen and Gruber 2000, Chetty 2008,
LaLumia 2013), define the start of an unemployment spell as when a person transitions from having
a job to having no job. An unemployment spell ends when the person is no longer unemployed.
Following the literature, I restrict the sample to workers with some observed work history prior to
their first observed unemployment spell. This makes sure the unemployment spell is not left-censored
and focuses the sample to individuals with labor force attachment. I use the answers to questions
about UI receipt to classify an unemployment spell as “ever/never received UI.” In my sample, the
reported rates of UI receipt range from 27% in 2008 to 42% during 2009-2010.
I use a person’s reported state of residence during an unemployment spell to classify her into state
groups.12 One issue is that the effect of the retention policy potentially depends on the expected
duration of benefits and states implemented different UI extensions in the past recession. I exclude
states that did not implement the second tier of extension before November 2009. This restriction
drops North Dakota, Nebraska, South Dakota, and Utah out of the sample.
State-level analysis I conduct two analyses using the SIPP sample. First, I show state-level aggregate
patterns. Specifically, I compute the proportion of unemployment spells ending in re-employment
during a period of time. I use the spells ending by June 2010 for the pre-July 2010 analyses and spells
ending during Nov 2010-2013 for the post-July 2010 results to allow delays for policy implementation.
Table 1 presents the average re-employment measure for each state group and by UI recipient status.
Numbers in parentheses indicate the total number of unemployment spells in the sub-group.13
Consistent with the intuition, the upper panel of Table 1 shows that among unemployment spells
ever receiving UI benefits, the aggregate re-employment measure is higher in states where it is easier
to collect previous benefits. For example, in states with the most lenient re-qualifying policy and
hence most difficult to collect previous benefits (Group I), 53% of unemployment spells end in re-
employment by June 2010, whereas 59% end in re-employment in states where it is easiest to collect
previous benefits (Group III). The other unemployment spells either end with the individual going
out of labor force, or continue by June 2010.
Among the control group of unemployment spells that were never on UI, the re-employment
probability does not differ consistently across state groups. The non-recipient group controls for
conditions that differ consistently across state groups (for example, firm-side conditions, aggregate
12Sometimes an unemployed person may move across states (ninety unemployment spells in my sample include at
least one move that lead to a change in state group). In cases where such a move changes the state group, I use the
person’s last state of residence during the spell, assuming she is collecting in her last state residence and so this state’s
UI policy potentially affects her re-employment incentive and opportunity.
13Appendix B includes the re-employment measures for each year. The patterns are consistent with evidence pre-
sented here.
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Table 1: Cross-State Difference in Re-employment Measure.
Group I Group II Group III
(8 states) (16 states) (22 states)
Pre-July 2010: Easier to collect previous benefits
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Spells ever received UI 0.530 0.549 0.587
Number of spells (417) (1164) (898)
Spells never received UI 0.514 0.518 0.491
Number of spells (660) (1849) (1588)
Post-July 2010: No cross-state difference in retention policy
Spells ever received UI 0.528 0.482 0.506
Number of spells (475) (1430) (845)
Note: SIPP 2008 panel, restricted to individuals ages 20 to 64 at time of survey. Measure calculates proportion
of unemployment spells ending in re-employment. Numbers in parentheses are total number of unemployment
for the sub-group. The upper panel uses unemployment spells that end by June 2010, the second lower
panel includes spells which end during Nov 2010-2013. Sample restricted to states implementing similar
benefit extension tiers: states with no EUC 2 before Nov 2009 ND, NE, SD, UT) are excluded; state with no
retention policy (VA) is excluded.
shocks). As a second control group, I look at the UI-receiving spells after July 2010, when a federal
law removed the cross-state policy difference on delayed benefit collection. The lower panel of Table
1 shows that in this group, again, there is no consistent pattern across state groups. To the extent
that the two control groups capture any economic conditions that vary systematically across state
groups, the results here suggest that prior to July 2010 the retention policy, by allowing unemployed
workers to collect previous benefits (or equivalently, delay collection of benefits), increases workers’
re-employment incentives in a recession.
Individual-level analysis While the state-level patterns are perhaps more transparent, they do not
control for individual-level characteristics that may vary consistently across states or state groups.
It is also difficult to interpret the economic and statistical significance of the cross-state group
differences.
As a second analysis using the SIPP data I use information at the individual level to estimate
the hazard of exiting an unemployment spell into a new job. I do so by estimating Cox proportional
hazard models, regressing the log hazard rate on a set of dummy variables for state group.14 To con-
trol for different labor force composition across states, I include controls for individual demographics
14The setup of the regression model is similar to LaLumia (2013) with the estimating equation:
log(ℎi,t) = Ñ𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝i + Ò𝑋i,t + 𝜖i,t (1)
where ℎ is the hazard rate, 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 is a collection of dummy variables for each state group, and 𝑋 includes all
individual and state-level controls and fixed effects. Compared with that paper, I exclude control variables meant to
capture the liquidity need and access of the unemployed worker, e.g. number of children, net liquid wealth. For the
purpose of my analysis, I also count short employment episodes (< 4 weeks) as re-employment.
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(gender, education, age) as well as pre-unemployment work characteristics (job tenure, monthly earn-
ings, industry).15 Additionally, I control for the monthly state-level unemployment rates and include
year fixed effects to address issues related to different and time-varying state economic conditions.
Estimates from the hazard model are shown in Table 2. Similar to the state-level analysis, I
estimate the model using three samples: (1) UI recipients during 2008-June 2010 (the pre-July 2010
sample); (2) non-UI recipients during 2008-June 2010; (3) UI recipients during Nov 2010-2013 (the
post-July 2010 sample). For easy interpretation I report the coefficients (not hazard rates) in this
table.
Table 2: Individual-Level Hazard Model Estimates.
(1) Pre-July
2010, UI
(2) Pre-July
2010, no UI
(3) Post-July
2010, UI
StateGroup (group II is omitted)
I (hardest) −0.129* −0.058 0.056
III (easiest) 0.114** −0.026 0.003
White 0.345** 0.2325** 0.103
Married 0.073 0.088* −0.030
High school or less −0.312** −0.024 −0.0017
Age 0.026 0.018 0.043**
Age squared −0.00046** −0.00037** −0.00064**
Pre-unemp monthly earnings($1000) 0.033** 0.020 0.031**
Pre-unemp job tenure −0.012* 0.014** -0.001
Left-censored job tenure −0.120 0.042 −0.235**
State unemp rate −0.051** −0.057** −0.059**
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Pre-unemp industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Number of spells 3321 4536 1989
Note: Table reports coefficients from hazard model estimates. SIPP 2008 panel, restricted to individuals ages
20 to 64 at time of survey. Columns (1)-(2) use samples by June-2010, Column (3) use samples during Nov
2010-2013. Sample restricted to states implementing similar benefit extension tiers: states with no EUC 2
before Nov 2009 ND, NE, SD, UT) are excluded; state with no retention policy (VA) is excluded.
** 𝑝 < 5%. * 𝑝 < 10%.
The key variables of interest are the StateGroup dummies. I omit group 2, so the StateGroup
coefficients are relative to group 2. Consistent with the state-level evidence, column (1) shows that
before the implementation of federal law in July 2010, the re-employment hazard rate among the
15Some pre-unemployment job spells are left-censored, which may downward bias the measure of job tenure. I include
a dummy variable for when an employment spell is left-censored. To control for the pre-unemployment industry I
include broad categories of industry fixed effects. The industries are: construction, manufacturing, wholesale, retail,
transportation, administration, education, health care, accommodation and food, other services, and other industries.
They are meant to capture the industry-specific skills acquired at these pre-unemployment jobs, which may affect the
worker’s ability and incentive to get re-employed in a different industry.
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UI recipients in group I states (hardest to collect previous benefits) is about 13 percent lower than
the re-employment hazard of UI recipients in group II states (significant at the 10% level); and the
re-employment rate in group III states (easiest to collect previous benefits) is 11 percent higher than
that in group II states (significant at the 5% level). The StateGroup coefficients in columns (2) and
(3) do not show similar patterns: both groups I and III have lower re-employment rates than group
II states among non-UI recipients; both groups I and III have higher re-employment rates than group
II among UI recipients after the implementation of the federal law; and none of these coefficients are
statistically significant even at the 20% level.16
The empirical analyses so far suggest that the retention policy may indeed have an impact on
the work decision of unemployed workers. In the next two sections I use a structural model that
incorporates the necessary policy elements to illustrate how the retention policy affects individual
behavior, and use model counterfactuals to evaluate the aggregate effects.
3 A Baseline Model
This Section extends the canonical McCall (1970) framework to include UI eligibility and wage in-
dexed benefits and then illustrates the effect of the U.S. retention policy on the job-finding incentives
of workers. As the retention policy has small effects when UI benefits are relatively short-lived, such
as during non-recessionary times, I assume that the economy is in a recession and has sufficiently
extended UI payments.17 To ease exposition, I initially assume that eligibility and exhaustion of
benefits follow probabilistic processes. The quantitative exercise in the next section adopts processes
that more closely follow the institutional details.
3.1 Model setup
Environment Time is discrete and infinite. The economy consists of a mass of infinitely lived
workers. The measure of workers is normalized to one. In any given period, a worker can be either
employed or unemployed. I assume risk-neutral workers for now, and consider risk-averse workers in
16Perhaps reassuringly, some of the control variables have similar effects across the three samples: being white,
having higher pre-unemployment monthly earnings are associated with higher re-employment probabilities, while living
in states with higher unemployment rates and being less educated (only significant for the first sample) are associated
with lower re-employment probabilities. One thing worth noting is the positive correlation between pre-unemployment
earning and re-employment rates. This does not detract from the story here. Individuals who make more at their
pre-unemployment jobs may be better positioned to find a new job (e.g. better networks, a wide range of jobs to
choose from). The mechanism emphasized in present paper is how the expectation of low-paying jobs leading to low
benefits in future unemployment deter individuals with relatively high prior earnings from taking these jobs.
17For the analysis in this section, I assume the recession is long enough to reach a near steady state.
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the quantitative exercise. Workers maximize expected lifetime utility given by
E0
∞∑︁
t=0
Ñt𝑐t
where E0 is the period 0 expectation factor, and Ñ is the time discount factor. Period utility
comprises of utility from consumption of goods 𝑐 and is increasing in 𝑐. Each period, an employed
worker gets paid wages 𝑤, which depend on the type of the job. An unemployed worker receives 𝑐
from non-monetary benefits such as leisure and home production. Additionally, if the unemployed
worker qualifies for unemployment benefits, she also receives 𝑏 which is a function of previous wages.
There are no private insurance markets and workers cannot save or borrow.
Labor market With probability 𝜌 each period an unemployed worker receives a job offer. A pro-
portion 𝜌g of the jobs are ‘good’ jobs with higher wages and longer expected job tenure; and the rest
𝜌b = 1− 𝜌g are ‘bad’ jobs.
18 Depending on the job type, with an exogenous job separation probability
Óg or Ób each period, a worker becomes unemployed. Good and bad jobs differ in the following ways:
Good jobs pay higher wages and have longer expected job tenure than bad jobs, 𝑤g >𝑤b and Óg < Ób,
but good jobs are scarcer 𝜌g < 𝜌b.
UI policy structure Not all unemployed workers receive benefits. With probability Ú a newly unem-
ployed worker qualifies for new benefits. Each period, benefits expire with an exogenous probability
𝑒, so that benefits do not last forever. In the quantitative model, I model benefit exhaustion dis-
cretely. UI benefits are indexed on wages of previous employment through Òæ, where Ò has the
interpretation of the monetary replacement ratio, and æ denotes wages at the previous job.
Worker’s problem An unemployed worker has individual state æ, which equals the wages at her
previous employment {𝑤g,𝑤b} if she has benefits, or 0 if no benefits. When a bad job offer arrives
(with probability 𝜌𝜌b), the unemployed worker chooses whether to accept it or wait for a better job
offer. Her problem can be written recursively as follows for æ ∈ {𝑤g,𝑤b,0},
𝑈 (æ) = Òæ+ 𝑐+ Ñ (1− 𝜌)
[︁
𝑒𝑈(0) + (1− 𝑒)𝑈 (æ)
]︁
⏟  ⏞  
doesn’t receive a job offer
+Ñ 𝜌
[︁
𝜌g𝑊g(æ) + 𝜌b
accept/reject bad job⏞  ⏟  
max{𝑊b(æ), 𝑒𝑈(0) + (1− 𝑒)𝑈 (æ)}
]︁
⏟  ⏞  
receives a job offer
, (2)
where 𝑈 is the unemployed worker’s value function, and𝑊k is the value function of a worker employed
18This specification avoids the cases of having two (one good and one bad) jobs. It assumes that workers send out
multiple job requests or resumes each period, and that the marginal cost of sending a job application is low such that
workers send resumes to job postings that ex post he would not take.
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at job type 𝑘 = {𝑔,𝑏} and is given by
𝑊k(æ) = 𝑤k + Ñ (1− Ók)𝑊k(æ)⏟  ⏞  
keeps job
+Ñ Ók
[︁
Ú𝑈 (𝑤k) + (1− Ú)𝑈 (æ)
]︁
⏟  ⏞  
loses job
. (3)
In the above unemployed worker’s problem, her current consumption consists of base consumption 𝑐
and benefits Òæ (if no benefits then æ = 0). If she doesn’t receive a job offer, then with probability 𝑒
she loses benefits next period. With probability 𝜌 she receives a job offer. Conditional on receiving
an offer, the job is a good job (𝑔) with probability 𝜌g. Without loss of generality, I assume for now
that a good job is good enough that an unemployed worker does not reject it. If the job offer is a bad
job (𝑏), the unemployed worker decides whether to accept it and start working the next period, or
reject it and wait for a better future offer. The cost of waiting is lower consumption in unemployment
relative to employment, and the possibility of benefit exhaustion next period (with probability 𝑒).
A worker at job type 𝑘 gets paid wages 𝑤k. With the type specific job separation probability Ók
she loses her job and becomes unemployed next period. With probability Ú the newly unemployed
worker qualifies for new benefits Ò𝑤k next period, otherwise she can collect any leftover benefits from
when she was last unemployed at the benefit level Òæ, where again æ ∈ {𝑤g,𝑤b,0}. This last part
captures the retention policy. Without it, a newly unemployed worker who does not qualify for new
benefits will go without benefits.
It is important that an employed worker inherits the individual state æ from when she was last
unemployed. This keeps track of her previous benefit status and level, and the difference between
past and current benefits is important to the retention policy. In particular, æ = 0 means she did not
have benefits (or benefits ran out) by the end of her previous unemployment spell, and so when she
becomes unemployed again she either gets new benefits if her current job qualifies for new benefits
or no benefits.
3.2 Retention policy and job take-up
From the unemployed worker’s problem, an unemployed worker with benefits Òæ accepts a bad job
if and only if
𝑊b(æ) ≥ 𝑒𝑈(0) + (1− 𝑒)𝑈 (æ) (4)
Assuming unemployed workers without benefits do not reject jobs, i.e. 𝑊b(0) ≥ 𝑈 (0), so
𝑈(0) = 𝑐+ Ñ(1− 𝜌)𝑈(0) + Ñ𝜌
⎦
𝜌g𝑊g(0) + 𝜌b𝑊b(0)
⎢
(5)
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Writing (4) explicitly for æ ∈ {𝑤g,𝑤b}, she accepts the job if and only if
0≤ 𝑤b − 𝑐− (1− 𝑒)Òæ+ Ñ(1− Ób − 𝜌)
[︁
𝑊b(æ)− (𝑒𝑈(0) + (1− 𝑒)𝑈 (æ))
]︁
+Ñ𝜌𝑒
[︁
𝜌g(𝑊g(æ)−𝑊g(0)) + 𝜌b(𝑊b(æ)−𝑊b(0))
]︁
− Ñ𝜌𝜌g
[︁
𝑊g(æ)−𝑊b(æ)
]︁
⏟  ⏞  
job type effect
+Ñ𝑒(1+ Ób − 𝑒− 𝜌+ 𝜌𝑒)
[︁
𝑈 (æ)−𝑈 (0)
]︁
⏟  ⏞  
benefit eligibility effect
+ÑÚÓb
[︁
𝑈 (𝑤b)−𝑈 (æ)
]︁
⏟  ⏞  
retention effect
. (6)
The first line contains the standard incentives to accept a job: Accept if the wage from a bad job
(𝑤b) is high enough relative to the combined base consumption (𝑐) and benefits (𝜌æ) if any; or if the
future value of working at a bad job is high enough relative to the value of unemployment.
There are three additional effects. All three effects take place in the periods after the next period
(hence discounted by Ñ). First, the job type effect represents the marginal gain (loss) of accepting
a bad job relative to waiting for a good job. In particular, a larger share of good jobs (larger 𝜌g)
or a larger difference in the values of good and bad jobs reduces the likelihood of accepting a bad
job. Second, the benefit eligibility effect represents the additional value of keeping benefits, which
disappears when benefits last forever (𝑒 = 0). Third, the retention effect comes from the difference
between the value of being unemployed after taking a bad job (𝑈 (𝑤b)) and the value of current
unemployment (𝑈(æ)).
The retention effect is zero if the current benefit level is low (æ = 𝑤b), and negative if the current
benefit level is high (æ = 𝑤g). A negative retention effect makes it less likely for a worker to accept
a bad job offer. Due to the retention effect, unemployed workers who had higher wages and hence
high benefits are more likely to reject bad job offers. When bad jobs are less secure (Ób is larger),
the negative effect of retention policy is amplified.19 The size of the effect is also larger when it
is easier to qualify for new benefits (Ú is larger), or with a larger wage gap 𝑤g −𝑤b. Additionally,
the effect of the retention policy should also depend on how long the unemployed worker can collect
benefits, because the longer she can collect, the more benefits she can potentially carry over to
future unemployment spells. But because all unemployed workers face the same benefit exhaustion
probability 𝑒, this effect is not present in the simple model. For the quantitative model in the next
section, I model discrete benefit exhaustion, and so workers at different point in their unemployment
spell face different benefit exhaustion probabilities (0 or 1).
The retention effect here assumes workers do not have the choice between old and new benefits.
More specifically, the unemployed worker receiving high benefits today is discouraged from accept-
ing low-paying jobs because of the prospect of lower benefits in future unemployment spells. The
19A larger Ób also reduces the value of unemployment with low benefits, and increases the size of the unemployment
value difference |𝑈(𝑤b)−𝑈(𝑤g)|, which further increases the effect of the retention policy. This relationship is confirmed
in the quantitative model.
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parameter Ú here captures the cross-state difference in policy explained in the previous section. A
larger Ú corresponds to states where it is easier to re-qualify for new benefits after a short period
of employment. Because when a newly unemployed worker qualifies for new benefits she has to for-
feit her old uncollected benefits, the negative incentives on job take-up by high-benefit unemployed
workers are also more severe in these states.
After July 2010. Consider the policy after July 2010, when a federal law removed the cross-state
differences in the retention policy by giving workers a choice between new and old benefits. Now the
retention effect becomes
ÑÚÓbmax
{︁
𝑈 (𝑤b)−𝑈 (æ), 0
}︁
= 0 (7)
In this case, because the unemployed worker can choose between the leftover benefits (Òæ) and new
benefits, the retention effect is zero. The retention policy does not have any additional incentive
effects on the worker with higher benefits (æ = 𝑤g).
4 Quantitative Analysis
This section quantifies the effect of the retention policy during a recession. The empirical evidence
presented in Section 2 provides some directions for modeling choice. A structural model allows for
counterfactual analyses to isolate the effects of policy from cyclical changes in the labor market.
It extends the illustrative simple model in the previous section to introduce risk-averse workers,
duration-dependent UI benefit exhaustion and re-qualification. With risk aversion workers have
incentives to self-insure through job choices. Non-stochastic UI exhaustion means an unemployed
worker collecting her first week of benefits will make different job decisions from someone at her
last week of benefits. This difference is both consistent with empirical findings and relevant for the
choice between new and old benefits. As extensions to the baseline quantitative model, I further
allow workers to save and borrow and consider alternate assumptions on the UI system and the
labor market in the next section.
4.1 Quantitative model
The quantitative model retains many features from the previous section. The first notable change is
that workers are risk averse with utility from consumption at time 𝑡 given by 𝑢(𝑐t).
Below I highlight the other key differences.
UI policy Newly unemployed workers may qualify for entitlement of benefits for a length of 𝐽t
periods. When an unemployed worker exhausts her entitlement, she becomes unemployed without
benefits and consumes base consumption. In other words, there is no stacking of multiple segments
of benefits. As with the previous section, benefit levels are proportional to wages of the most recent
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employment spell.
Two remarks are in order. First, in the U.S. unemployment benefits are often not linear in past
wages, but are bounded at the top. Incorporating this feature would reduce the difference in the
values of unemployment with low and high benefits when the high benefit hits the upper bound
(𝑈 (𝑤b)−𝑊 (𝑤g) of the retention effect in Equation (6)). Consequently, the effect of the retention
effect is smaller. Second, in most U.S. states (all but nine states), not everyone qualifies for the
maximum entitlement. Instead, workers who have not earned sufficient wages or worked long enough
within the past year qualify for shorter benefit entitlements. This feature makes taking a temp
job even less appealing, and potentially increases the impact of the retention policy. I discuss the
relevance of these features for the quantitative results in Section 5.
Unlike in the previous section, here I model the retention policy by keeping track of discrete
periods of employment on temp jobs. Workers re-qualify for new benefits when they have accumulated
enough wage earnings by the state’s standard.20 For workers on regular jobs I use a Poisson process to
model benefit qualification, for two reasons. First, the re-qualify rule applies to earnings accumulated
within a short period of time, typically one year, and workers on regular jobs with much longer
expected job tenures are not subject to the re-qualify rule. Second, workers sometimes do not collect
benefits that they qualify, for reasons outside the scope of this paper. Non-collection is likely more
prevalent among workers on regular jobs. As such, using a discrete process to model benefit eligibility
for regular job workers would overstate the population of UI recipients.21
Labor market Similar to the previous section, there are two types of jobs, regular job and temp job.
Regular jobs pay higher wages than temp jobs. In particular, wages of regular jobs are drawn from
a known distribution, whereas the wages of temp jobs are fixed at a lower bound 𝑤. The different
wage structures mirror reality: temp jobs often have fixed wages around the minimum wage level,
whereas regular jobs offer a menu of wages. Section 5 introduces multiple wages for temp jobs as
well.
Additionally, regular jobs have longer expected job tenures, i.e. lower exogenous job separation
rates Óg,t < Ób,t. In a recession, regular jobs become less secure, i.e. Óg,t becomes larger, whereas the
expected job tenure of temp jobs remains unchanged over the cycle. This assumption is motivated by
the observation that while the probability of being laid off from a regular job is likely higher during
recessions, the probability of ending a temp job is mostly unchanged throughout cycles. Job arrival
rates are summarized by 𝜌t and 𝜌g,t, similar to the simple model. In a recession, both 𝜌t and 𝜌g,t
become smaller. Not only do jobs become scarcer overall but good jobs become even more so than
bad jobs.22
20This also means workers may have an incentive to quit before they qualify for new benefits, if they would rather
collect old benefits. I do not allow quitting in the benchmark model here, and explore the alternative in Section 5.
21For discussions on non-collection see, for example, Auray, Fuller, and Lkhagvasuren (2019).
22In the calibration, both 𝜌𝜌g and 𝜌𝜌b are smaller in the recession. In other words, the unconditional arrival rates of
both type jobs become lower in a recession.
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Worker’s problem In addition to the previous wages æ of an unemployed worker, I also keep track of
her UI usage with the individual state 𝑗, which records the number of periods of the current UI spell
that she has used. While æ does not change throughout an unemployment spell, 𝑗 increases by 1 each
period during the same unemployment spell, until it reaches the maximum potential entitlement 𝐽t.
𝐽t may be time-varying: larger in recessions than during normal times because of benefit extensions.
This is consistent with the implementation of benefit extensions in the U.S. A worker originally
entitled for 26 weeks at the time of her job separation may end up receiving 52 weeks as a result of
extensions.23 Once all benefit entitlement are exhausted, she becomes unemployed without benefits
(æ = 0, 𝑗 = 0). Each period, the unemployed worker receives a job offer, either a regular job or a
temp job, according to the stochastic processes outlined before. She then decides whether to accept
the job.24
The unemployed worker’s problem can be written as
𝑈t(æ,𝑗) = 𝑢(Òæ+ 𝑐) + Ñ(1− 𝜌t)𝑉t+1(æ,𝑗)
+Ñ𝜌t
⎦
𝜌g,tEwmax{𝑊g,t+1(w), 𝑉t+1(æ,𝑗)}+ 𝜌b,tmax{𝑊b,t+1(æ,𝑗,1), 𝑉t+1(æ,𝑗)}
⎢
(8)
where
𝑉t+1(æ,𝑗) = 1{𝑗 = 𝐽t}𝑈t(0,0) + 1{𝑗 < 𝐽t}𝑈t(æ,𝑗 + 1) (9)
is the value of entering period 𝑡 + 1 without a job. I use 𝐽𝑜𝑏g,t(æ,𝑗,w), 𝐽𝑜𝑏b,t(æ,𝑗) ∈ {0,1} to
denote the time-𝑡 decisions to reject/accept a regular job (at wage w) and a temp job, respectively. I
focus on these job take-up decisions later to demonstrate the impacts of policy on individual choices.
Because of the restriction of at most one job offer in each period, an unemployed worker with a job
offer will only make one reject/accept decision.
Workers on regular jobs are not subject to the income requirement of the re-qualify rules and
are not affected by the retention policy. Their only individual state is the wage, which is initially
drawn from a known distribution 𝐹 (w), with support w ∈ [𝑤L,𝑤H ], and remains unchanged during
the same employment spell. A worker newly unemployed from a regular job collects benefits with
23This setup may become problematic if the original entitlement is longer than the subsequent maximum entitlement,
e.g. 𝐽t−1 >𝐽t. This happens when UI benefit extensions are (gradually) removed. In reality, the worker can potentially
collect all 𝐽t−1 periods of benefits even though the current maximum benefit period is lower than her entitlement. The
setup here does not take this into account. But since the transitional period I analyze (up until 2012) only had
extensions and no removals, this issue does not create a problem here.
24For simplicity I make the restriction that an unemployed worker receives at most one job offer in each period. In
other words, with probability 𝜌t the unemployed gets a chance to draw a job. Proportion 𝜌g,t of all job offers are
regular jobs, and by law of large numbers that is the probability that the worker ‘draws’ a regular job offer.
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probability Ú. Her value function is given by
𝑊g,t(w) = 𝑢(w) + Ñ(1− Óg,t)𝑊g,t+1(w) + ÑÓg,t
⎦
Ú𝑈t+1(w,1) + (1− Ú)𝑈t+1(0,0)
⎢
(10)
Workers on temp jobs are subject to the income requirement of the re-qualify rule and the
retention policy, and they have the choice between new and old UI after July 2010. So the worker’s
individual states include the same states inherited from her previous unemployment: (æ,𝑗), which
stay unchanged during the temp job. An additional state 𝑗𝑤 keeps track of the number of periods
employed and increases each period during the same spell. To simplify the analysis, no quitting is
allowed in this baseline model. The temp worker’s value function is given by25
𝑊b,t(æ,𝑗,𝑗𝑤) = 𝑢(𝑤) + Ñ(1− Ób,t)𝑊b,t+1(æ,𝑗,𝑗𝑤+ 1) (11)
+
∏︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⨄︁
⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋃︁
(recession, before July 2010)
ÑÓb,t
⎦
𝑄s(æ,𝑗𝑤)𝑈t+1(𝑤,1) + (1−𝑄s(æ,𝑗𝑤))𝑈t+1(æ,𝑗)
⎢
(recession, after July 2010)
ÑÓb,t
⎦
𝑄s(æ,𝑗𝑤)max
⎭
𝑈t+1(𝑤,1), 𝑈t+1(æ,𝑗)
}︂
+ (1−𝑄s(æ,𝑗𝑤))𝑈t+1(æ,𝑗)
⎢
(non-recession)
ÑÓb,t
⎦
𝑄s(æ,𝑗𝑤)𝑈t+1(𝑤,1) + (1−𝑄s(æ,𝑗𝑤))𝑈t+1(0,0)
⎢
where
𝑄s(æ,𝑗𝑤) = 1{𝑤× 𝑗𝑤 ≥𝑋sÒæ} (12)
is an indicator whether the worker has worked enough to re-qualify for a new UI segment. It depends
on the income requirement multiple 𝑋s which differs across U.S. states, the worker’s previous benefit
level Òæ, and the cumulative wages earned during the current employment spell 𝑤× 𝑗𝑤.
In a recession, when the retention policy has the most impact, a newly unemployed temp worker
who does not re-qualify for new benefits can use any leftover benefits from her previous unemployment
spell. New and old benefit segments potentially differ in both benefit level and duration: new benefit
level is linked to the wage of the temp job 𝑤 and has the full duration entitlement 𝐽t; old benefit
level depends on her previous wages æ and the benefit duration is the number of uncollected periods
from previous unemployment spell. Before July 2010, if an unemployed worker re-qualifies for new
benefits, she has to start the new UI segment; after July 2010, she can choose whether to start the
25Because the re-qualify criterion (modeled by 𝑄s here) depends on previous benefit level æ, the workers who do not
have benefits in the previous unemployment spell (æ = 0) are not subject to the retention policy. I modeled them as
facing the UI collection probability Ú when they become unemployed.
18
new UI segment or continue collecting the leftover benefits.26 I use 𝐹𝑖𝑥t(æ,𝑗) ∈ {0,1} to denote the
choice between old/new benefit segment in the post-July 2010 policy regime. During normal times,
the retention policy does not apply, and thus if a newly unemployed worker does not re-qualify for
new benefits, she becomes unemployed without benefits.
Stationary economy Given a UI policy regime, the economic conditions (job separation and arrival
rates) and the distribution of wages, a stationary economy is a collection of value functions, decision
rules and worker’s distribution, such that workers optimize by solving the problem stated above, and
the distribution of workers over individual states is stationary.
I compare the different policy regimes both in a steady state stationary economy resembling
the 2012 economy, and over a transition path during 2008-2012.27 The initial steady state on the
transition path is the pre-recession economy during 2005-2007, and the final steady state is the
economy in 2012. First I describe the calibration of parameters in the steady states.
4.2 Parametrization
I calibrate for the 2005-2007 economy using the steady state without UI extensions, and for the
2012 economy using the steady state with UI extensions, the retention policy and the federal law.
Some parameters are time-invariant such as preference parameters, and others are time-dependent,
especially labor market parameters. Table 3 summarizes the values of parameters. The model period
is one week.
The utility of consumption takes the following functional form
𝑢(𝑐) =
𝑐1⊗σ
1− à
.
I pick two parameters related to preferences. The discount factor Ñ is set to give a quarterly discount
factor of 0.99. The coefficient of relative risk aversion à is set to 2. The UI replacement ratio (Ò),
the ratio of benefits to wages, is set at 0.4 based on the numbers reported on the U.S. Department
of Labor (DOL) website for post-2000.
The temp job wage (𝑤) is set at 0.35 (normalized). The separation rate from temp jobs is
calibrated to an average expected job tenure of about one quarter (Ób = 0.08 ≈ 1/13). Both the
26As an example, suppose a worker becomes employed at a temp job after collecting 20 out of 26 weeks of UI benefits
at $20 per week. She subsequently does not re-qualified for a new UI segment when she loses her temp job. In this
case she can collect the remaining 6 weeks at $20 per week. If she re-qualifies for a new UI segment of 26 weeks at $10
per week, then before July 2010, she has to collect the new benefits and forfeit the old segment. Post-July 2010, she
has a choice between collecting $10/week for 26 weeks and $20 week for 6 weeks. It becomes clear from this example
that workers with longer previous unemployment spell (e.g. 2 weeks left over from the first UI segment) would most
likely prefer to collect the new benefits which pay out less each week but last longer; those with shorter previous
unemployment spell (e.g. 20 weeks left over) should prefer to collect the old benefits.
27I use 2012 as a relative steady state because by 2012 UI extensions have plateaued, the average job separation rates
have fallen back to pre-recession levels, and it has also been sometime after the change in federal policy in July 2010.
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Table 3: Summary of Parameters at Relative Steady States
Parameter Description Values
Time-invariant parameters
Ñ Time discount factor 0.991/13
à Coefficient of relative risk aversion 2
Ò UI replacement ratio 0.4
𝑐 Base consumption 0.02
Ú Prob. of UI collection from regular job 0.5
𝑤 Wages on temp job 0.35
Ób Temp job separation rate 0.08
[𝑤L,𝑤H ] Wages of regular job [0.3, 0.95]
𝑓(w) Distribution of regular job wage offer See Figure 3 blue cross
Time-varying parameters
2005-2007 2012
𝜌 Steady-state job arrival rate 0.25 0.25
𝜌g Steady-state proportion of regular job offer 0.5 0.195
Óg Steady-state regular job separation rate 0.0031 0.0031
𝐽 Steady-state UI entitlement 26 26+66
wages and expected job tenure of temp jobs are time invariant, which means any changes in the temp
job accept/reject decision over time is driven by changes in the value of waiting (for a better offer)
and the value of unemployment. The value of non-monetary benefits (𝑐) is set at 0.02 consistent
with Shimer (2005)’s low value of non-UI value of unemployment.28 The maximum potential UI
entitlement is 26 weeks in 2005-2007 and 26+66(extensions)=92 weeks in 2012. The job separation
rate from regular jobs is taken from data and at a weekly rate of 0.0031 for both 2005-2007 and 2012.
I use the SIPP 2004 panel to calibrate the wage distribution of regular jobs in 2005-2007. To
separate temp jobs, which typically have lower wages and shorter expected job tenure, from regular
jobs in the data, I use the observed job tenure to classify jobs: short-tenure jobs with less than or
equal to 4 months of observed tenure, and long-tenure with more than 12 months of observed tenure.
Jobs for which the entire tenure is not observed are not counted if the observed tenure is less than
4 months. Using this classification, I find that the median hourly wage of short-tenure jobs is lower
than the median wage of long-tenure jobs during 2005-2007 ($7.02 versus $11.36).29 I set the bounds
28Because there is no job search cost in the model, I need a base consumption for the unemployed that is lower than
the usual value of home production used in models with intensive job search and associated search cost. As such, this
base consumption can be interpreted as the value of home production less the cost of time and money associated with
obtaining an offer.
29I have also experimented with other ways to separate by job tenure, e.g. less than or equal to 1, 2, 3 months for
short-tenure; longer than 4, 6, 9 months for long tenure. The different classifications all give higher median wage at
long-tenure jobs. Given the weekly job separation rates of temp (0.08) and regular jobs (0.0031), the classification used
here seems the most reasonable.
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on regular job wages used in the model to 0.3 (𝑤L) and 0.95 (𝑤H), which correspond to the 10
th
and 80th percentiles of long-tenure job wages.30 In other words, some regular job offers may pay less
than the temp jobs, but the former offers better job security. This is meant to capture the left-tail
of the wage distribution among longer-tenure jobs. Given the range of the regular job wages, the
distribution of regular job offers 𝑓(w) is then discretized using 10 bins.
In the initial steady state (2005-2007) I jointly calibrate (1) the steady-state proportion of regular
jobs 𝜌g, (2) the job arrival rate 𝜌 and (3) the probability density of regular job wage offers 𝑓(w) to
match (a) the proportion of earnings changes that are negative, (b) the unemployment rate and (c)
the wage distribution of accepted regular jobs during 2005-2007. I hold the wage distribution 𝑓(w)
unchanged after the initial period, and allow the job arrival rates 𝜌 and 𝜌g to vary over time, so in
2012 I only calibrate (1)-(2) with targets (a) and (b).
The empirical counterpart of earnings change is calculated based on employment-unemployment-
employment (EUE) spells constructed using the SIPP 2004 and 2008 panels. For re-employment
jobs starting during 2005-2007 (2004 panel) around 40% had negative earnings change compared to
pre-unemployment earnings. The proportion is similar for re-employment starting in 2012 (from 2008
panel). I target unemployment rates of 4.2% during 2005-2007 and 8.5% in 2012. Note that because
the distribution of wage offers 𝑓(w) is not observed in the data, I use the stationary distribution
of accepted job offers to match the observed wage distribution. The wage distribution of accepted
regular jobs comes from SIPP and is plotted in Figure 3 (black triangle) along with the model
generated distribution (red circle) and the distribution of offered wages 𝑓(w) needed to generate the
distribution (blue cross). At the lower end of the distribution the density of offers is higher than
the density of accepted wages. Many offers at the lower end are turned down as some unemployed
workers find it optimal to wait for better job offers, which is especially true during the first few
periods of UI collection. As UI benefits run out, unemployed workers start taking these lower-paying
jobs as they come.
The distribution of earnings changes is important for the quantitative exercise. As a calibration
check, I compare the model-generated distribution of earnings changes to the data from 2005-2007
in Figure 4. The plot shows the earnings changes as ratios of the individual’s pre-unemployment
wages. I then group the earnings changes in both data and model into bins of size 0.1 for easy
comparison, with x-axis marking the centers of the bins. The model (red circle) generates the bell-
30Specifically, using the SIPP 2004 panel, I look at hourly wages for all jobs starting between 2005-2007. I first classify
jobs into short-tenure (<= 4 months with full employment spell observed) and long-tenure (> 12 months). I find the
median hourly wage of short-tenure jobs during this period is $7.02, setting this to be the normalized temp job wage.
I then use this value to normalize the long-tenure job wages. A normalized value of 0.3 corresponds to $6.02 which
is the 10th percentile on the long-tenure job wage distribution, and a normalized value of 0.95 is the 80th percentile.
As an alternative measure of earnings I use the reported monthly earnings of the jobs. The median monthly earnings
is $1014 for short-tenured jobs, and $1861 for long-tenured jobs; the normalized values of 0.3 and 0.95 correspond to
the 15th and 70th percentiles on the long-tenure job monthly earnings distribution. Both hourly wages and monthly
earnings are top-coded. The chosen normalized range seems reasonable given that it covers a wide range of earnings
on both income measures.
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Figure 3: Distribution of regular job wages in the initial steady state
Note: Data of accepted wage density distribution come from SIPP 2004 panel, for all jobs accepted during 2005-2007
lasting more than 12 months.
Figure 4: Distribution of earnings changes in initial steady state
Note: Earnings changes are calculated as ratios of pre-unemployment wages, i.e. (post-unemployment wage -
pre-unemployment wage)/pre-unemployment wage. Each bin groups earnings changes of 0.1, with center of bin
marked on x-axis, except for the last bin which contains changes >= 1.05. Data of earnings change come from SIPP
2004 panel, for all employment-unemployment-employment episodes with re-employment during 2005-2007.
shaped distribution centered around 0, similar to the data (black triangle). Compared to the data,
the model generates too many EUE episodes with little change in earnings (in bin marked 0, i.e.
earnings changes -0.05 to 0.05), and too few episodes with large earnings drop or gain (more than
50% drop or more than 100% rise).
4.3 Policy effects at steady state
To look at the steady state effects of the retention policy, I compare the steady state economies
under different policy regimes: no UI extension; with UI extensions but no retention policy, so
temp workers who do not re-qualify for new benefits have no benefits; with extension and retention
policies, so temp workers who re-qualify for new benefits forfeit any uncollected old benefits; and
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finally, extension, retention and the Federal law of July 2010, where temp workers can choose between
new and uncollected old benefits if they re-qualify for a new UI segment. All parameters are the
same across the economies and at the calibrated values of the 2012 economy.
Individual job decisions It is easier to understand the mechanisms in stationary economies when
fewer things are moving. As such, I first show the policy functions for the decision to accept/reject
a temp job.31 Figure 5 plots, for each of the policy scenarios, the types of unemployed workers who
reject a temp job. The bottom right economy is the one used to calibrate the 2012 economy, with
UI extension, retention and federal law.
In each plot, the x-axis marks the UI benefit level. Benefit level of 1 means the individual
previously held a temp job. Benefit levels greater than 1 correspond to benefits qualified from
regular jobs, each number corresponding to one bin in the wage distribution.32 The y-axis marks
the UI periods used (in weeks). A larger number means the individual is closer to UI exhaustion.
The shaded regions represent the worker types who would reject a temp job. The blue horizontal
line marks the maximum UI entitlement.
There are two reasons for an unemployed worker to turn down a temp job which are common
across all four policy regimes. First, by turning down a temp job the unemployed worker can wait for
a better job offer next period. The value of waiting is strongest at the start of a UI spell, but as UI
benefit comes close to exhaustion, more unemployed workers take temp jobs. This is why the lower
regions are mostly shaded in the plots, whereas higher up close to the maximum UI entitlement,
there is more job take-up (not shaded). Workers do not wait until the last week of UI entitlement
to accept a temp job because job arrival and the type of job that arrives (temp or regular, wages)
are stochastic. There may not be better or any job offers next period. A worker is more willing to
wait close to UI exhaustion if the base consumption in unemployment without UI (𝑐) is larger, the
job arrival rates (𝜌 and 𝜌g) are higher, or the wage distribution of regular jobs (𝑓(w)) becomes more
skewed to the right.
Second, an unemployed worker turns down a temp job if her benefit level is higher than the wage
offered. This is the case only for the highest wage bin (benefit level 11). Additionally, unemployed
workers with higher benefits (but not necessarily higher than temp wage) are more likely to turn
down the job to wait for a better offer because their consumption gain from employment is lower.
This is why the right regions are mostly shaded in the plots. For the same reasons, those with higher
benefits are more likely to wait longer, which is why the shaded regions in the plots mostly slope
upward to the right — all except for level 2 benefit which corresponds to the lowest wage level of a
regular job and is lower than the temp wage.
Comparing across the policy regimes, proportionally more unemployed workers turn down temp
31Some unemployed workers also reject lower-paid regular jobs. Across the policy regimes, rejection of regular jobs
is mostly the same. So the key margin of difference on the individual level is the decision to take up or reject temp
jobs.
32In the calibrated model, unemployed workers without UI benefits never reject a job.
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Figure 5: Comparison of temp job rejections across steady state economies in 2012.
Note: Plots show the decision rule 𝐽𝑜𝑏b(æ,𝑗) for each policy scenario. The types of unemployed worker — by benefit
level (x-axis) and UI periods used (y-axis) — who reject a temp job offer in a steady state economy are shaded.
Benefit level =1 when old job was temp job, benefit level = 2 to 11 corresponds to each of the ten bins of regular
wages. The lowest regular wage (level 2) is lower than temp wage (level 1). Blue horizontal line marks the maximum
UI entitlement in the economy.
jobs when UI extensions are introduced. Without the retention policy, unemployed workers in the
first few weeks of their current UI spell turn down temp jobs. With the retention policy, those with
relatively low benefit levels always take a temp job, independent of how many periods of the current
UI spell they have used. With the retention policy, any unused UI entitlements are ‘stored’ for their
next unemployment if they do not re-qualify for a new spell. The additional federal law further
increases the temp job accepting range to include those with middle range of benefit levels, because
these unemployed workers can now choose between new and unused old UI spells.
Distributional effects Different policy regimes also have distributional effects on the type of unem-
ployed workers in the steady state. Figure 6 compares the distribution across policy regimes along
two dimensions: benefit level (left plot) and UI entitlement used of the current spell (right plot).
Each line represents one steady state economy with a different policy regime, and the percent density
on a line sums up to 100%.
A UI extension from 26 to 92 weeks increases the proportion of unemployed workers with higher
benefit levels and raises the proportion of unemployed workers who are close to UI exhaustion (com-
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Figure 6: Comparison of the distribution of unemployed workers across steady state economies in
2012.
Note: Plots show the percent distribution of unemployed workers for each benefit level (left) or for different levels of
UI entitlement left (right). Each line represents the steady state economy with a different policy regime, and the total
density on a line sums up to 100%.
paring the dotted black line with the broken red line), because extensions allow the unemployed
workers to wait longer for better job offers.
The retention policy most notably increases the proportion of unemployed workers who have used
only a few periods of current UI spell (comparing the broken red line with the solid green line). With
the retention policy, more unemployed workers take up temp jobs which have short expected tenures,
so there are proportionally more unemployed workers who are freshly unemployed. In other words,
there are more workers in the economy who transition into and out of unemployment very quickly.
Figure 7: Effect of federal law: Distributional difference of unemployed workers.
Note: Plot shows the distributional effect of the federal law for unemployed workers over benefit level and UI periods
used. Distribution measure is computed as (density of the steady state economy with federal law - density of the
steady state economy without federal law)/total density without federal law×100%.
To better showcase the distributional effect of the federal law on top of the retention policy, I
plot the differences in density between the economies with and without the federal law, for each type
of unemployed workers by benefit level and UI periods used. Figure 7 shows that the federal law
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Figure 8: Effect of federal law: Temp workers choosing old benefits.
Note: Plot shows the decision rule 𝐹𝑖𝑥(æ,𝑗). The types of temp workers — by old benefit level (x-axis) and old UI
periods used (y-axis) — who choose the leftover of their old UI spell rather than newly qualified UI spell in a steady
state economy are shaded. Benefit level =1 when old job was temp job, benefit level = 2 to 11 corresponds to each of
the ten bins of regular wages. Blue horizontal line marks the maximum UI entitlement in the economy.
reduces the proportion of unemployed workers with low benefit levels and at the first few periods
of their UI spell (the blue downward spike). The federal law increases the proportion of those with
higher benefit level and close to the end of the current UI entitlement (the green upward spikes).
These distributional effects are present because many unemployed workers choose the old spell with
higher benefit level and fewer entitlement periods left. This can be seen also in Figure 8 which plots
the choice between new and old UI spells for temp workers: Workers with higher old benefit level
and at least about 10 weeks away from UI exhaustion on their old UI spell choose the old benefits
(shaded region).
Table 4: Comparison of steady state economies in 2012.
No extension Extension,
no retention
Extension +
Retention
Extension +
Retention +
Federal law
Job finding rate(%) 9.79 5.04 12.53 17.90
Unemployment rate(%) 7.11 9.60 9.21 8.67
% Workers on temp job 5.71 2.94 12.50 18.08
Note: Table reports aggregate statistics in each of the four steady state economies. The last economy
with extension, retention policy and federal law is calibrated to the economy of 2012. The other
three economies are counterfactuals with alternative policy regimes while holding all other parameters
unchanged.
Aggregate effects Table 4 compares the aggregate economies under different policy regimes. The UI
extension from 26 to 92 weeks lowers job finding rate, raises unemployment by 2.5 percentage points,
and reduces the proportion of workers on temp jobs as more unemployed workers wait around for
better job offers. With the retention policy more workers are willing to take up temp jobs, so the
overall job finding rate increases by 7.5 percentage points, and the proportion of workers on temp
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Figure 9: Paths of time-varying parameters 2008-2012.
Note: Plot shows the paths for the exogenous time-varying parameters which are inputs into the transitional
economies from 2008 to 2012. Separation rates Óg and maximum UI entitlements 𝐽 are taken from data and
smoothed. Job arrival rates 𝜌 and 𝜌g are calibrated to match statistics.
jobs increases by 9.6 percentage points. At the same time, because temp jobs have short expected
tenures, workers leave jobs much more frequently. As a result, the retention policy only reduces
unemployment by 0.39 percentage points. Similarly, with the introduction of the federal law, even
more workers take up temp jobs instead of waiting around for better offers, so the overall job finding
rate and the proportion of workers on temp jobs increase even further, and unemployment rate drops
by 0.54 percentage points.
4.4 Policy effects over transition path
To evaluate the policy effects during the recession, I compute the transition path between the two
steady states. The initial steady state resembles the pre-recession economy of 2005-2007 without UI
extensions, The end steady state is the economy of 2012 when both the job separation rates and UI
extensions have stabilized and the economy is approximately at a steady state.
Time-varying parameters Over the transition path between the two steady states, the job arrival
rates, 𝜌t and 𝜌g,t, the regular job separation rate, Óg,t, and the maximum potential UI entitlement,
𝐽t, change over time. When computing the transition path, I assume that the paths of the time-
varying parameters are revealed at the start of the transition path. In other words, it is a perfect
foresight transition given these exogenous paths. The assumption of perfect foresight makes solving
the transition path computationally manageable.33
Figure 9 shows the paths of the exogenous processes from 2008 to 2012. The path for the
maximum UI entitlement is taken directly from the U.S. Department of Labor Employment and
Training Administration (DOLETA) website. I smooth the regular job separation and UI entitlement
33Appendix C provides more details on the computational algorithm, which is similar to Conesa and Krueger (1999)
and Nakajima (2012) without prior announcement of policy changes.
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Figure 10: Comparison of transitional economies, 2008-2012.
Note: Plot shows the unemployment rate and proportion of workers on temp jobs in the transitional economies from
2008 to 2012 under different policy regimes. Each line represents a different transitional economy. Dots represent
data counterparts.
series before feeding them into the model to compute the transition path. Using the smoothed series
makes the assumption of a transition path with perfect foresight more reasonable.34
The paths for the proportion of regular jobs 𝜌g,t and the job arrival rates 𝜌t are jointly pinned down
to match the proportion of EUE spells with negative earnings changes (0.45) and the unemployment
rate (10%) in the second half of 2009.35 This requires job arrival rates (solid black line) to drop from
0.25 to 0.15 in 2009 before recovering to the pre-recession level, and the proportion of regular jobs
among job offers (dotted black line) to fall from 0.5 to 0.195 in 2009 and stay low.36
Policy experiments Given the initial (2005-2007) and end (2012) steady states and the time-varying
parameters during transition, Figure 10 plots the transition paths under different policy regimes.
Each line represents one transitional economy from the same initial steady state economy and ends in
different steady state economies but otherwise experience the same time-varying parameters (except
for UI extensions for the economy without extensions). I assume policy differences are revealed at
the start of the transition path. The economy with extension and retention policies (solid green
line) should be the closest to the real economy up until mid-2010 when a different policy regime
(with federal law) was implemented. And the gap between two lines captures the policy effect. I
additionally plot the data counterparts of unemployment rates and proportion of workers on temp
jobs.
34It would be hard to imagine that the workers and firms perfectly foresee the exact scale and timing of changes in
UI entitlement in Figure 9 or the short-term fluctuations in the job separation rates. It is more reasonable to think of
workers forming expectations about the general paths of UI extension and job separation risks.
35Since the peak of unemployment around the second of 2009 is before July 2010 when the federal law came into
effect, I use the model-generated moments on the transition without federal law. This is consistent with the federal
law being unanticipated.
36The calibrated 𝜌 and 𝜌g values mean the job arrival rates for both temp and regular jobs are lower during the
peak of the recession (2009) than either before (2005-2007) or after (2012). The calibrated temp job arrival rate in
2009 is 0.15 ∗ 0.805 = 0.1207 lower than both the initial steady state (0.25 ∗ 0.5 = 0.125) and the end steady state
(0.25 ∗ 0.805= 0.2013). Similarly, the calibrated regular job arrival rate in 2009 is 0.0292, lower than the initial steady
state (0.125) and the end (0.0488).
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Consistent with the findings for the steady state economies, UI extension raises both unemploy-
ment rate and proportion of workers on temp jobs. Introducing the retention policy at the start
of the transition raises the proportion of temp workers and lowers unemployment relative to the
economy without the retention policy. Implementing the federal law on top of the retention policy
from the start further raises the proportion of temp workers and lowers unemployment pre-2010.
Over the transition path the policy effects on unemployment are amplified. For example, the
retention policy reduces unemployment rate by up to 2 percentage points over the transition (com-
paring the broken red line to the solid green line), whereas in the end steady state the difference is
only 0.39 percentage point. Similarly, the federal law also has a larger effect on unemployment at the
peak of the recession (the dashed blue line compared to the solid green line) than in the steady state.
To better understand what drives the amplification, I decompose the policy effects by introducing
one time-varying parameter at a time.
Decomposing effects of time-varying parameters I look at a set of transitional economies with
one time-varying parameter at a time (Óg, 𝜌, 𝜌g) while holding all others constant (except for UI
extensions 𝐽). All transitions still start from the same initial steady state as before, but the steady
state economy at the end of the transition is different from before.
Figure 11 shows that the proportion of regular jobs 𝜌g is important for amplifying the unemploy-
ment effects of the retention policy as well as the federal law. 𝜌g is also key to generating differences
in the proportion of temp workers. Intuitively, a high value of 𝜌g pre-recession means there are many
workers with relatively high wages entering the recession, and these are the people most affected by
the retention policy. During the recession, when 𝜌g is lower, many job offers are temp jobs with
relatively low wages, so many unemployed workers have to decide whether to take temp jobs. The
high level of 𝜌g pre-recession and low level during the recession together generate large retention
effects both with and without the federal law.
5 Extensions
This section discusses some extensions to the quantitative model of the previous section. Appendix
D contains the full setup and results of these alternative specifications.
5.1 Additional features of the UI system
UI benefit with upper bound In the baseline model, UI benefits are proportional to the most recent
wages (Ò𝑤). In the U.S. benefit level is subject to an upper bound. An alternative to the baseline
specification is to set weekly benefit to max{Ò𝑤, ?¯?}. In other words, workers with wages 𝑤 > ?¯?/Ò
have benefits lower than Ò𝑤 when they are unemployed. Most U.S. states set the maximum weekly
benefit amount at around $400 in 2008. A quick back-of-the-envelop calculation shows none of the
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Figure 11: Decomposing effects of parameters (Óg, 𝜌, 𝜌g) over transition, 2008-2012.
(a) Only changing regular job separation rates Óg
(b) Only changing job arrival rates 𝜌
(c) Only changing prop. of regular jobs among offers 𝜌g
wages in my range hit the upper bound: $400 weekly benefits converts to $1000 weekly earnings.
Using a weekly working hour of 40 hours gives $25 hourly wages, which is approximately 1.25 on the
normalized scale ($7.02 being 0.35), much higher than the 0.95 upper bound on the regular job wage
range used in the model, which is the 80th percentile of wages in the data.
Temp job qualifies for shorter UI benefits The standard benefit duration is 26 weeks. Nine states
provide a uniform potential duration of 26 weeks to all recipients who qualify for UI benefits. The
remaining states adopt variable duration policies whereby the entitled duration is based on the re-
cipients’ most recent work experience. In the baseline quantitative model, I assume all unemployed
workers who qualify for UI are automatically entitled to the full 26 weeks (and extensions accord-
ingly). As an alternative, I assume here that workers newly unemployed from temp jobs qualify for
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shorter durations (‘partial UI’) with 𝐽(𝑤) = 2𝐽/3, and consistently with the implementation of UI
extensions, the extensions are also lower for these workers.
Appendix D.1 contains the results for this specification. Without re-calibrating the model, I show
the changes in individual’s job decision compared to the baseline model. Because workers who had
temp jobs qualify for shorter UI entitlement, they accept temp jobs sooner than in the baseline to
avoid running out of benefits. This change in individual choice raises overall job finding rate, lowers
unemployment and raises the proportion of workers on temp jobs in the steady state economies
without the retention policy. In the economy without extensions, the job finding rate rises from
9.79% to 12.46%, unemployment falls from 7.11% to 5.99%, and the proportion of workers on temp
jobs rises from 5.7% to 6.3%; similarly for the economy with extension but without the retention
policy. In the economies with the retention policy, these same workers accept a temp job regardless
of UI entitlement, and so introducing partial UI has no effect on the aggregate economies. With the
partial UI, the effects of different policy regimes during the transition are also similar to the baseline
results.
5.2 Saving and borrowing
Worker’s ability to borrow and save can be important for the impact of UI policy. Saving and
borrowing provides partial self-insurance against business cycles and policy changes. As it substitutes
for the consumption smoothing effect of the retention policy, the effect of the policy should be smaller
when saving and borrowing are allowed. I augment the quantitative model to include a choice to
save/borrow each period subject to a borrowing constraint, which I set to −0.2 (some borrowing)
or 0 (no borrowing). I keep the rest of the parameters the same as in the quantitative baseline to
show any differences from the baseline model. Details of the asset model and steady state results are
included in Appendix D.2.
Consistent with intuitions, across all policy regimes, unemployed workers with higher asset levels
wait longer before accepting a job. This is especially so at low benefit levels. For example, with
UI extension but no retention policy, unemployed workers with the lowest benefit level (level 2) and
lowest asset level accept a temp job whenever it arrives, whereas those with the same benefit level
but the highest asset level would wait until they have used 80 weeks of UI before accepting the job.
Compared with the model without saving and borrowing, the unemployed workers with the
highest asset level here are always more likely to turn down a temp job given the same UI benefit
level. Those with the lowest asset level are less likely to turn down a temp job than in the baseline
(without asset) if their benefit level is low. But if their benefit level is high, then allowing saving and
borrowing delays their job take-up. This is the same whether I allow some borrowing so the lowest
asset level is negative, or no borrowing. With high benefit levels the unemployed worker can save
up while collecting benefits, and this saving creates a buffer against low consumption when benefits
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run out, allowing them to wait longer for a better job offer.
Comparing across policy regimes, the directions of the policy effects on individual’s job decisions
are the same as in the baseline, but the sizes of the effects are smaller. Specifically, both the retention
policy and the federal law have stronger effects on unemployed workers with lower asset levels. But
even for these workers, the effects of policies are smaller than in the baseline model.
Because of the weaker effects of the retention policy on the individual level, the aggregate policy
effects are also smaller. For example, introducing the retention policy in a steady state increases the
overall job finding rate by 3 percentage points compared to 7.5 percentage points in the baseline.
Because of the smaller gain in job finding rate, unemployment rate increases instead of falls, as an
increased proportion of temp jobs in the economy raises the average job separation rates. Similarly,
introducing the federal law on top of the retention policy raises the overall job finding rate by 0.5
percentage point in the economy with borrowing and saving, compared to 5.43 percentage points in
the baseline.37
One caveat to the quantitative results is the calibrated model does not try to match the joint
employment-wealth distribution in the data. Many of the unemployed workers likely have very low
levels of liquid assets, especially during the Great Recession. This means the proportion of credit-
constrained unemployed workers in the data is likely larger than in the calibrated model here. Because
those with low asset levels are affected more by the retention policy, in a model with realistically
calibrated wealth distribution, the policy effects would be stronger, and unemployment could be
lower with the introduction of the retention policy.
5.3 Alternate assumptions on the labor market
Job quits One reason that workers turn down temp jobs in the model is the optional value of
waiting, which works because of the underlying assumption of no quitting from a job. In the model,
with stochastic job separation and UI qualification, a worker would not take a job if she expects to
quit later. But with deterministic UI re-qualification, a temp worker’s continuation value changes
with periods worked. As a result, with the retention policy a worker may accept a temp job and
37In Appendix D.2 I include a set of plots to show the distributional effects of various policies, similar to Figure
6 in the baseline. I plot the percent distribution of unemployed workers over benefit level and over UI periods used,
separately for the bottom 5 asset levels (low asset group) and the top 5 asset levels (high asset group). A few interesting
effects are worth noting. First, for the low asset group, without UI extensions, the unemployed workers are very likely
to end up in the lower benefit level; with UI extensions, they are more likely to be unemployed with higher benefit
levels. This is because the unemployed workers with low asset levels cannot effectively smooth consumption between
unemployment with and without benefits, and as a result, they accept a temp job too soon, and once unemployed
again they end up with the low benefit level; UI extensions allow these people longer time to wait for a better offer
and increases their chances of getting a better job offer. Second, the distribution of unemployed workers in the high
asset group is mostly unaffected by different policy regimes. Curiously, over UI periods used, the high asset group
concentrates around the first 10 periods, which indicates that regardless of the policy regime, they find jobs very
quickly. This is partly an equilibrium outcome: high asset levels are positively correlated with shorter time spent in
unemployment, because the workers who find jobs faster can accumulate more savings while they work.
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quit right before she re-qualifies for new benefits in order to preserve her old benefits. In practice
in the U.S., a worker who voluntarily quits from her job without a ‘good cause’ is not eligible to
collect unemployment benefits. Temp workers, arguably with less resource, are less likely to quit if
quitting means they cannot collect unemployment benefits. Among workers on short-term (less than
four months tenure) jobs in the SIPP 2008 panel, 20-25% of job separations are because of quitting,
compared to 40-50% among long-term job workers (≥ 12 months job tenure).38
To see how quitting works in the model, I allow workers on temp jobs the decision to quit and
still be eligible to collect and retain benefits. Results are included in Appendix D.3. Regular job
workers do not have incentives to quit. In general, a worker quits if the continuation value of working
is lower than the future value of quitting into unemployment. This happens if future unemployment
is likely (e.g. high job separation rate), and the value of unemployment now is high enough relative
to the value of unemployment later (e.g. if benefits are higher by quitting now). This is not the case
in the calibrated economies of 2012 without the retention policy, and so no one quits and the job
take-up decisions and the aggregate economies are identical to those in the baseline.
With the retention policy, however, workers do quit. Interestingly, because of the option to quit,
unemployed workers are more likely to accept a temp job in the economy without the federal law,
because they can always quit before re-qualifying for new lower benefits. As a result, the overall
job finding rate is higher in this economy compared with the baseline (18.07% vs 12.53%). There
are proportionally more temp workers in this economy (13.5% vs 12.5%), and unemployment rate is
slightly lower (9.12% vs 9.21%) than in the baseline.
Overall, the retention policy increases the job finding rate, reduces the unemployment rate. The
federal law on top of the retention policy further raises the job finding rate and lowers unemployment,
consistent with the baseline results.
Wage dispersion in temp jobs In the baseline model temp jobs all offer the same wages, while regular
jobs offer a wide range of wages. As an extension, I introduce a (small) range of wages for the temp job
as well. In particular, a temp job wage offer takes one of three values: {0.3,0.35 (baseline value),0.37}
with probabilities [0.25,0.5,0.25]. The rest of the parameters are kept the same as in the baseline.
Note that the lowest wage of a regular job (0.33) is lower than the two highest wages of a temp job,
the rest of the regular job wages are higher than all temp wages. Appendix D.4 contains the results.
On the individual level, most unemployed workers turn down temp jobs with the lowest wage
level, and policy has very small effects here. The retention policy and the federal law do have
significant effects on the decision to accept temp jobs with the highest wage level. Overall, the
effects of policy is smaller than in the baseline. The retention policy increases the overall job finding
38SIPP reports reason for job separation. I code a separation as because of quitting if the reported reason is “Quit
to take another job”, “Unsatisfactory work arrangements” or “Quit for some other reason”; separation is not because
of quitting if the reason is “On layoff”, “Discharged/fired”, “Employer bankrupt”, “Employer sold business”, “Job was
temporary and ended”, or “Slack work or business conditions”. I drop the separations from this calculation if the
reported reason indicates the workers is temporarily or permanently out of labor force, .e.g “Retirement or old age”,
“Childcare problems”.
rate by 2.34 percentage points compared to 7.5 percentage points in the baseline. As a result,
unemployment increases with the introduction of the retention policy, as the increase in the average
job separation rate offsets the relatively small increase in overall job finding rate. Introducing the
federal law increases the job finding rate further and lowers unemployment rate, but unemployment
is still higher than the economy without the retention policy.
Note that the quantitative effects of policy depend on the range and distribution of the temp job
wage offers. In general, the retention policy increases job finding rate more if the wage offer has a
bigger range or if the distribution is more concentrated in the center.
Human capital depreciation Human capital depreciation during unemployment potentially reduces
future wages, and as a result, unemployed workers have an additional incentive to find a job sooner
rather than later. Whether and how human capital changes the estimated effects of the retention
policy will depend on how human capital accumulates and depreciates, for example, whether working
on a temp job reduces human capital stock, and how specific is human capital to a (type of) job.
The gain in human capital from continued employment is likely small in the short and medium
term, and especially so during recessions. Using the SIPP 2008 panel I estimate the effect on hourly
wage (or monthly earnings) of two types of human capital: the short-term (the observed number
of periods that a worker has worked up to time t) and the long-term (the potential experience of a
person up until time t). I control for demographics, whether the worker has had an unemployment
spell, the worker’s industry, and the monthly unemployment rate of her state of residence. The
regression results in Appendix D.5 show that the short-term human capital stock has about 60% of
the effect of the long-term human capital. An additional month of the long-term human capital is
associated with $15 additional monthly earnings or $0.5 more in hourly wages, whereas an additional
month in the short-term human capital is associated with $9.7 additional monthly earnings or $0.3
more in hourly wages.
Because of the relatively small effects, and the fact that the human capital process for temp jobs
lack empirical discipline, I abstract from the human capital aspect in the analysis here.
6 Conclusion
This paper investigates an unemployment benefit policy that allows the unemployed workers to delay
the collection of benefits to future unemployment spells (the retention policy). I first document
that during recessions in the U.S. workers can and do take advantage of the policy when they
are offered a short-term job. Exploiting policy variations over time and across U.S. states, I then
present evidence that allowing workers access to delayed benefit collection encourages job take-up.
Intuitively, the ‘saved’ benefits help smooth consumption between two unemployment spells and
encourage unemployed workers to take low-paying, short-term jobs.
I then build a quantitative model where the unemployed workers choose to accept/reject a job
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depending on their current benefit level, UI entitlement left, and the nature of the job (wage level,
expected job tenure). I incorporate institutional details consistent with the retention policy, and
show the effects are consistent with expectations. In a wide range of extensions that the retention
policy increases the overall job finding rate in the steady state stationary economy. The policy has
varying effects on unemployment rates, depending on the relative scale of the effects on job finding
rates. In a calibrated version of the transitional economy from 2008 to 2012, the retention policy
lowers the unemployment rate by up to 2%, mitigating the negative effects of UI extensions.
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A Example of policy variations across U.S. states
This section provides an example to illustrate the cross-state difference in retention policy. The
example here complements the discussion in Section 2.1.
Figure A1: Illustration of cross-state difference in retention policy.
This example illustrates how cross-state differences in income requirement for UI re-qualification
affect benefit collection. Figure A1 compares two states. The example follows a worker who becomes
unemployed twice within a 95-week period. Her first work spell (weeks 1 to 35) is long and wages
are high. This is analogous to pre-recession times. Her second work spell (weeks 65 to 75) is short
and wages are lower, which mimics what happens in a bad labor market where good jobs are few
and separation rates are high. The unemployment income (UI benefits) is determined by (1) the
wages of her most recent work spell; and (2) whether or not she re-qualifies for new benefit segment
during the second unemployment spell. Because her wages during the second work spell is lower, her
benefits (if she re-qualifies for a new benefit segment) is much lower during the second than the first
unemployment spell.
For illustrative purpose, suppose Illinois (blue line) has a very low income requirement such that
the worker can more easily re-qualify for new benefits, which are lower than her previous benefits.
As a result, the worker cannot collect at the higher previous benefit level. In contrast, Maryland
(green line) has a higher income requirement for UI re-qualification, which makes it harder for her
to re-qualify for new benefits and easier to continue collecting the leftover benefits from the first
unemployment spell.
Anticipating the difference in income level during the second unemployment spell, workers have
different work incentives during the first unemployment spell. In Maryland, where the expected
2
income during the second unemployment spell is relatively high, the worker has more incentives to
find any job. In contrast, in Illinois, she is more cautious (or picky) about jobs, because working
for low pay re-qualifies her for lower benefits, which is worse than not working and collecting the
higher benefits from her first benefit segment. Following this logic, the probability that an average
worker finds a job within a set period of time will be higher in Maryland than in Illinois. Note that
in addition to benefit level, the duration of benefits is also a factor in the worker’s choice. Because
newly qualified benefits start from week 1, the duration on the new UI segment is most likely longer
than any uncollected old benefits. In the quantitative model I take into account this difference by
modeling deterministic UI exhaustion.
3
B State-level re-employment probability measures by year
This section supplements the state-level empirical analysis and presents state-level re-employment
probability by year. Consistent with state-level analysis shown in Section 2.2, before 2010 the re-
employment probability among unemployment spells that ever received UI (left plot) is higher in
states where it is easier to collect previous benefits: group 3 (green cross) has higher re-employment
probabilities than group 2 (orange circle) than group 1 (blue triangle). After 2010 or among spells
that never received UI (right plot) there is no consistent pattern.
Figure A2: State-level re-employment probability measures by year
Note: Details of the re-employment measure and interpretation of the pattern can be found in Section 2.2.
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C Computational algorithm for the transitional economy
This subsection gives details on the algorithm used to compute the transition path between two
steady states, assuming perfect foresight. The algorithm is similar to Conesa and Krueger (1999)
and Nakajima (2012) and described in Ríos-Rull (1999).
• First, solve the worker’s problems for each period on the transition path, 𝑡= 1,2, . . . ,𝑇
– Start from the end steady state (calibrated to 2012 target moments). Assuming the
transition ends in this steady state.
– Solve the worker’s problem in the last period, 𝑡= 𝑇 , given the value functions next period
are the same as the end steady state, and also given the parameter values and policy for
this period. This step gives the worker’s value functions and decision rules for 𝑡= 𝑇 .
– Solve the worker’s problem backward, for 𝑡= 𝑇 −1,𝑇 −2, . . . ,2, using the value functions of
period 𝑡+ 1 as the continuation values. This step assumes that in period 𝑡 the individuals
have perfect foresight for the states of the economy (parameters, policy) in period 𝑡+ 1.
– Finally, solve the worker’s problem in the first period on the transition path. Check
that the value functions and decision rules are close enough to the initial steady state
(calibrated to 2005-2007 target moments).
• Next, compute the stationary distribution of workers over individual states
– Start from the initial steady state (calibrated to 2005-2007 target moments).
– Compute the density over individual states in the first period on the transition path, given
the distribution in the initial steady state and the decision rules solved in the previous
step. Check that all densities sum up to 1.
– Compute the distribution forward, for 𝑡 = 2,3, . . . ,𝑇 − 1, using the distribution for the
period 𝑡 − 1 and the decision rules for period 𝑡. Check at each step to make sure all
densities sum up to 1.
– Finally, compute the distribution in the final period on the transition path. Check that
the distribution is close enough to the end steady state (calibrated to 2012 moments).
Typically, given that parameters and policy have maintained the same levels for some
periods, this convergence is approximated quite well.
5
D Results for alternative setups in Section 5
D.1 Model where temp job qualifies for shorter UI benefits
This subsection contains results for the specification where temp job qualifies for shorter UI entitle-
ment: 𝐽(𝑤) = 2𝐽/3. Section 5.1 provides the rationale for this specification and the discussion of
results.
Figure A3: Model where temp job qualifies for shorter UI benefits:
Comparison of temp job rejections across steady state economies in 2012.
Note: Plots show the decision rule 𝐽𝑜𝑏b(æ,𝑗) for each policy scenario. The types of unemployed worker — by benefit
level (x-axis) and UI periods used (y-axis) — who reject a temp job offer in a steady state economy are shaded. Sold
blocks mark job rejections in the baseline model (the same as Figure 5). Broken blocks mark job rejections in the
model with partial UI entitlement. Benefit level =1 when old job was temp job, benefit level = 2 to 11 corresponds to
each of the ten bins of regular wages. Blue horizontal line marks the maximum UI entitlement in the economy.
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Figure A4: Model where temp job qualifies for shorter UI benefits:
Comparison of the distribution of unemployed workers across steady state economies in 2012.
Note: Plots show the percent distribution of unemployed workers for each benefit level (left) or for different levels of
UI entitlement used (right). Each line represents the steady state economy with a different policy regime, and the
total density on a line sums up to 100%.
Table A1: Model where temp job qualifies for shorter UI benefits:
Comparison of steady state economies in 2012.
No extension Extension,
no retention
Extension +
Retention
Extension +
Retention +
Federal law
Job finding rate(%) 12.46 5.27 12.53 17.90
Unemployment rate(%) 5.99 9.53 9.21 8.67
% Workers on temp job 6.29 3.19 12.50 18.08
Note: Table reports aggregate statistics in each of the four steady state economies. The last econ-
omy with extension, retention policy and federal law resembles the economy of 2012. The other three
economies are counterfactuals with alternative policy regimes while holding all other parameters un-
changed.
7
Figure A5: Model where temp job qualifies for shorter UI benefits:
Comparison of transitional economies, 2008-2012.
Note: Plot shows the unemployment rate and proportion of workers on temp jobs in the transitional economies from
2008 to 2012 under different policy regimes. Each line represents a different transitional economy. Dots represent
data counterparts.
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D.2 Saving and borrowing
This subsection lays out the worker’s problem for the model with saving and borrowing. The results
are discussed in Section 5.2.
Model with saving and borrowing The unemployed worker with previous wage æ, at her 𝑗th UI
period, and asset holding 𝑎 chooses next period’s asset holding 𝑎′ to maximize the utility from
consumption and expected future utility, conditional on her future job choices. Asset position is
subject to a lower bound 𝑎, such that 𝑎 = 0 means there is no borrowing, and 𝑎 < 0 indicates
some borrowing is allowed. Once asset holding choice is made, she consumes UI benefits (Òæ), base
consumption (𝑐), and net asset holding (𝑅𝑎− 𝑎′).
𝑈t(æ,𝑗,𝑎) = max
a′⊙a
𝑢(Òæ+ 𝑐+𝑅𝑎− 𝑎′) + Ñ(1− 𝜌t)𝑉t+1(æ,𝑗,𝑎
′)
+Ñ𝜌t
⎦
𝜌g,tEwmax{𝑊g,t+1(w,𝑎
′), 𝑉t+1(æ,𝑗,𝑎
′)}+ 𝜌b,tmax{𝑊b,t+1(æ,𝑗,1,𝑎
′), 𝑉t+1(æ,𝑗,𝑎
′)}
⎢
where
𝑉t+1(æ,𝑗,𝑎
′) = 1{𝑗 = 𝐽t}𝑈t(0,0,𝑎
′) + 1{𝑗 < 𝐽t}𝑈t(æ,𝑗 + 1,𝑎
′)
Similarly, the worker on regular job with wage 𝑤 and asset holding 𝑎 chooses future asset position
𝑎′ ≥ 𝑎 to maximize her utility from consumption and expected future utility. Her consumption
depends on wage (𝑤) and net asset holding (𝑅𝑎− 𝑎′).
𝑊g,t(w,𝑎) = max
a′⊙a
𝑢(w +𝑅𝑎− 𝑎′) + Ñ(1− Óg,t)𝑊g,t+1(w,𝑎
′) + ÑÓg,t
⎦
Ú𝑈t+1(w,1,𝑎
′) + (1− Ú)𝑈t+1(0,0,𝑎
′)
⎢
The worker on temp job with previous UI benefit indexed by æ, 𝑗th periods of UI benefit used
during the previous unemployment spell, 𝑗𝑤 periods worked on current job, and asset holding 𝑎
chooses future asset position 𝑎′ to maximize the utility from consumption and expected future utility,
taking as given her choice of UI segment (new or old) if available. Her consumption consists of wage
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income (𝑤) and net asset holding (𝑅𝑎− 𝑎′).
𝑊b,t(æ,𝑗,𝑗𝑤,𝑎) = max
a′⊙a
𝑢(𝑤+𝑅𝑎− 𝑎′) + Ñ(1− Ób,t)𝑊b,t+1(æ,𝑗,𝑗𝑤+ 1,𝑎
′)
+
∏︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⨄︁
⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋁︁⋃︁
(recession, before July 2010)
ÑÓb,t
⎦
𝑄s(æ,𝑗𝑤)𝑈t+1(𝑤,1,𝑎′) + (1−𝑄s(æ,𝑗𝑤))𝑈t+1(æ,𝑗,𝑎′)
⎢
(recession, after July 2010)
ÑÓb,t
⎦
𝑄s(æ,𝑗𝑤)max
⎭
𝑈t+1(𝑤,1,𝑎′), 𝑈t+1(æ,𝑗,𝑎′)
}︂
+ (1−𝑄s(æ,𝑗𝑤))𝑈t+1(æ,𝑗,𝑎′)
⎢
(non-recession)
ÑÓb,t
⎦
𝑄s(æ,𝑗𝑤)𝑈t+1(𝑤,1,𝑎′) + (1−𝑄s(æ,𝑗𝑤))𝑈t+1(0,0,𝑎′)
⎢
where 𝑄s is as defined before by Equation (12).
I discretize the asset grid [𝑎,𝑎max] with a step size of 0.05. I set the upper bound 𝑎max = 1.0
and check that it does not bind. The lower bound 𝑎min is set at 0 (no borrowing) or −0.2 (some
borrowing). Interest rate is set at 0.06% weekly or 3% per annum.
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Results in steady state 2012 Results are discussed in Section 5.2. I show the results with both saving
and borrowing (𝑎min = −0.2). When borrowing is not allowed (𝑎min = 0) the results are similar.
Figure A6: Saving and borrowing (𝑎min = −0.2):
Comparison of temp job rejections across steady state economies in 2012.
Note: Plots show the decision rule 𝐽𝑜𝑏b(æ,𝑗,𝑎) for each policy scenario. The types of unemployed worker — by
benefit level (x-axis) and UI periods used (y-axis) — who reject a temp job offer in a steady state economy are
shaded. Sold grey blocks mark job rejections for unemployed workers with the lowest asset level; broken blocks mark
job rejections for those with the highest asset level. Semi-transparent red blocks mark job rejections in the baseline
model without saving and borrowing (the same as Figure 5). Benefit level =1 when old job was temp job, benefit
level = 2 to 11 corresponds to each of the ten bins of regular wages. Blue horizontal line marks the maximum UI
entitlement in the economy.
Table A2: Saving and borrowing (𝑎min = −0.2):
Comparison of steady state economies in 2012.
No extension Extension,
no retention
Extension +
Retention
Extension +
Retention +
Federal law
Job finding rate(%) 10.04 5.07 8.08 8.57
Unemployment rate(%) 7.96 9.86 10.63 10.46
% Workers on temp job 7.26 3.18 8.47 8.99
Note: Table reports aggregate statistics in each of the four steady state economies. The last economy
with extension, retention policy and federal law is calibrated to the economy of 2012. The other
three economies are counterfactuals with alternative policy regimes while holding all other parameters
unchanged.
11
Figure A7: Saving and borrowing (𝑎min = −0.2):
Comparison of the distribution of unemployed workers across steady state economies in 2012.
(a) Bottom 5 asset levels
(b) Top 5 asset levels
Note: Plots show the percent distribution of unemployed workers for each benefit level (top) or for different levels of
UI entitlement used (bottom). Distribution is plotted by asset levels: left two plots are for unemployed workers in the
bottom 5 asset levels, right two plots are for those in the top 5 asset levels. Each line represents the steady state
economy with a different policy regime. Distribution is presented as percent density on a line so the total density on a
line sums up to 100%.
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D.3 Job quits
This subsection contains results for the specification where workers on temp jobs are allowed to quit
and still collect benefits. Section 5.3 provides the rationale for this specification and the discussion
of results.
Figure A8: Job quits:
Comparison of temp job rejections across steady state economies in 2012.
Note: Plots show the decision rule 𝐽𝑜𝑏b(æ,𝑗) for each policy scenario. The types of unemployed worker — by benefit
level (x-axis) and UI periods used (y-axis) — who reject a temp job offer in a steady state economy are shaded. Sold
blocks mark job rejections in the baseline model (the same as Figure 5). Broken blocks mark job rejections in the
model with the option to quit. Benefit level =1 when old job was temp job, benefit level = 2 to 11 corresponds to
each of the ten bins of regular wages. Blue horizontal line marks the maximum UI entitlement in the economy.
Table A3: Job quits:
Comparison of steady state economies in 2012.
No extension Extension,
no retention
Extension +
Retention
Extension +
Retention +
Federal law
Job finding rate(%) 9.79 5.04 18.07 17.90
Unemployment rate(%) 7.11 9.60 9.12 8.67
% Workers on temp job 5.71 2.94 13.5 18.08
Note: Table reports aggregate statistics in each of the four steady state economies. The last econ-
omy with extension, retention policy and federal law resembles the economy of 2012. The other three
economies are counterfactuals with alternative policy regimes while holding all other parameters un-
changed.
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D.4 Wage dispersion in temp jobs
This subsection contains results for the specification where temp job offers three possible levels of
wages: {0.3,0.35 (baseline value),0.37}, with probabilities: [0.25,0.5,0.25]. The rest of the parame-
ters are kept the same as in the baseline. Section 5.3 provides the rationale for this specification and
the discussion of results.
Figure A9: Wage dispersion in temp jobs:
Comparison of temp job rejections across steady state economies in 2012.
Note: Plots show the decision rule 𝐽𝑜𝑏b(æ,𝑗) for each policy scenario. The types of unemployed worker — by benefit
level (x-axis) and UI periods used (y-axis) — who reject a temp job offer in a steady state economy are shaded. Sold
grey blocks mark rejections of the lowest temp wage offer; broken blocks mark rejections of the highest temp wage
offer. Benefit level = 1,2,3 when old job was temp job, benefit level >= 4 corresponds to each of the ten bins of
regular wages. Blue horizontal line marks the maximum UI entitlement in the economy. The dotted vertical line
marks previous job: to the left are unemployed workers previously on temp jobs (wage levels 0.3, 0.35, 0.37); to the
right are those previously on regular jobs
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Table A4: Wage dispersion in temp jobs:
Comparison of steady state economies in 2012.
No extension Extension,
no retention
Extension +
Retention
Extension +
Retention +
Federal law
Job finding rate(%) 10.04 5.23 7.57 14.62
Unemployment rate(%) 7.26 9.59 11.65 10.58
% Workers on temp job 6.20 3.18 8.95 18.48
Note: Table reports aggregate statistics in each of the four steady state economies. The last econ-
omy with extension, retention policy and federal law resembles the economy of 2012. The other three
economies are counterfactuals with alternative policy regimes while holding all other parameters un-
changed.
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D.5 The effect of human capital
This subsection contains regression results of hourly wages or monthly earnings on short-term or
long-term human capital. Results are discussed in Section 5.3. Long-term human capital is proxied
by potential experience (in months) defined as the difference between a person’s age at a time and
years of education. Short-term human capital is the observed cumulative months worked by a person
at the time.
Table A5: Regression results of wage or earning on accumulated short-term or long-term human
capital.
Dependent Variables
Independent Variables Hourly wage Monthly earning
Long-term human capital 0.051** 15.2**
Short-term human capital 0.031** 9.7**
Note: Table reports coefficients hourly wage or monthly earnings regressions. Each entry is result
from one regression. Each column is a different dependent variable, each row is a different inde-
pendent variable. SIPP 2008 panel, restricted to individuals ages 20 to 64 at time of survey. All
regressions include controls for demographics (race, age, educational attainment), industry of work
dummies, monthly unemployment rate of state of residence, whether the individual has had an
unemployment spell. Standard errors clustered at the individual level.
** 𝑝 < 5. * 𝑝 < 10.
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